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ENCE.
PERHAPS nothing in recent legal history is more remarkable than
the general acquiescence of the public in the asserted right to bring
into court and before legislative bodies, as instruments of evidence,
the private messages sent by telegraph. It is remarkable not only
because legal analogies and precedents seem to be against the right,
but also because the power to make this use of telegrams i liable
to enormous abuses, and seems to be opposed to one of the first and
most vital principles of liberty.
Telegraphy is a new business in the world. When it first began
it became manifest at once that a'very considerable proportion of
the correspondence of the world must be done by it, and the ques-
tion arose how it should be dealt with by the law. Governments
then controlled the carriage of correspondence, and the telegraph
assumed the position, to some extent at least, of a rival of the
government. It would perhaps have been competent for our own
government at that time to do what the government of Great Britain
has since done-take charge of telegraphy as a part of the postal
service, and wholly exclude competition. The government did not
see fit to do this. On the co ntrary it welcomed the telegraph as
an important and useful auxiliary, and the states proceeded to pass
laws for its regulation, and to lend aid in its extension. It may
justly be said then that public policy favored and encouraged the
telegraph.
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For the most part telegraph companies were left to make rules
and regulations to govern their own business, and they have estab-
lished many rules which have passed under judicial supervision, but
with which we are not concerned now. One rule, which has probably
come into existence by usage rather than by legislation, is that
under which the original of any message sent and a copy of the reply
are left in possession of the telegraph company. The chief and
possibly the only purpose of this is that the telegraph company
may have in its own hands the means of protection, in case it is
charged with mistakes in transmitting messages, or with sending
forged or fraudulent despatches. The most important regula-
tion which has been established by statute is that inviolable
secrecy shall be preserved in respect to messages by those through
whose hands they shall pass; severe penalties being imposed upon
operators who violate this injunction. Government has thus done
all that was in its power to give to parties conducting correspond-
ence by telegraph the advantages they would have in conducting
private correspondence by the mail, while they also have the addi-
tional advantage of expedition.
There are thus to every telegraphic 'despatch three parties-the
sender, the receiver and the telegraph company. No doubt each
of these has a certain control in respect to the message. For their
own purposes the sender and receiver may make use of it as they
would or might of any private letter which had passed between
them. The telegraph company must preserve inviolable secrecy
in respect to it, but if the company were to be sued for error of
negligence in transmitting it, the message would thereby be brought
before the court, and the company might make use of it for its own
protection. The privilege of secrecy is the privilege of the par-
ties, and would necessarily be waived by either if he were to com-
plain of the company's action in respect to it. It is customary to
provide by statute that the operator shall transmit all messages in the
order in which they are received; and it has been held that he has no
authority to refuse to transmit any message, even though it be sent
to favor an immoral purpose, (Western Union Telegraph 0o. v.
Ferguson, 51 Ind. 495), any more than a postmaster has to detain a
letter for a similar reason. Of course it is competent to provide
by law-as is sometimes done-that such telegrams may be re-
fused.
The question to which attention is now directed is whether the
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telegrams, thus left in custody of telegraph companies, may, by any
process of law, be brought into court without the consent of either
of the parties, in order that they may be used as evidence in suits
or prosecutions instituted by others. In discussing this question it
will be assumed that there is no express prohibition of law, and
that if prohibited at all it is by the penalty which is imposed for
voluntary disclosures, or by those maxims of the common law by
which individual liberty is guarded and protected. The question is
therefore one of constitutional law; a question, too, not dependent
so much upon the words of any express provision of the Constitu-
tion as upon the previous history in the light of whict constitutions
must be interpreted.
As popular and legislative power increases in this country, less
attention is paid to the English precedents by the aid of which
constitutional liberty has been established. We come, perhaps
habitually, to look upon these as having been useful in setting
bounds to the authority of the crown; forgetting that upon them
may still depend the liberty of the citizen. Constitutional discus-
sions take a direction somewhat different from that in former days:
they involve technicalities more; the construction of words and
phrases, and the extent of prohibitions, while the general principles
which are-the animating spirit of constitutional law, and without
which the organic forms may support despotism as readily as lib-
erty, are passed by with little notibe. Such a course would be
proper enough if those principles had become so firmly settled and
fixed in the minds and consciences of all classes of officials as to
be habitually recognised and observed; but no thoughtful and ob-
servant person will venture to affirm that he believes this to be the
case. On the contrary, a sentiment prevails which favors the ex-
ercise of doubtful powers. The popular impression,; though it may
not often find voice, is that, when the monarchical principle was
eliminated from the Constitution, dangers to personal liberty were
in great measure precluded; and one who often appeals to ante-
revolutionary precedents, against oppressive official action, is likely
to be charged with excessive conservatism, and 'perhaps with ped-
antry. Under the influence of this impression popular majorities
have freely exercised questionable powers, legislation has been too
little regardful of private rights, and executive authorities, when
the popular feeling has accompanied their action, have often exer-
cised, with little criticism, authority that would not be. acquiesced
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in without protest in Great Britain. The decision in Milligan's
Case, 4 Wall. 2, did very much to check a tendency in this direc-
tion, but did not by any means overcome it. And this must be
our apology for calling attention briefly to precedents which we
may suppose are familiar, but the full import of which is not so
generally acknowledged as it should be.
Our constitutional provisions for the protection of private papers
may unquestionably find their best explanation in Wilkes's Case,
and in the legal proceedings which grew out of it. It will be re-
membered that, enraged by the attacks of the "North Briton"
upon the prerogative, Lord Halifax, Secretary of State, issued a
general warrant, which commanded the messengers, taking with
them a constable, to search for the authors, printers and publishers,
and to apprehend and seize them, together with their papers. It
was under the pretended authority of this warrant that the
premises of Wilkes were invaded, his desks broken open, and his
papers carried off. All the cases which grew out of this transac-
tion turned upon the validity of the warrant, as a protection to the
parties executing it; but the court, in disposing of them, did not
overlook the seizure of private papers, and in the name of the law
condemned it unsparingly. "Papers," said Lord CAMDEN, "are
the owner's goods and chattels: they are his dearest property, and
are so far from enduring a seizure that they will hardly bear an
inspection; and, though the eye cannot by the laws of England be
guilty of a trespass, yet, where private papers are removed and
carried away, the secret nature of those goods will be an aggrava-
tion of the trespass, and demand more considerable damages in
that respect. Where is the written law that gives a magistrate
such a power? I can safely answer, there is none; and, therefore,
it is too much for us, without such authority, to pronounce a prac-
tice legal which would be subversive of all the comforts of society."
.Fntinek v. Carrington, 19 State Trials 1030, 1065; s. c. 2 Wils.
275 ; s. c. Broom Const. L. 558 ; Wilkes v. Wood, 19 State Trials
1154; S. c. Lofft's Reports 1; s. c. Broom Const. L. 548. The
case, as will be seen, did not by any means turn wholly upon the
breaking into the tenement and the forcing of locks, but it brought
to the front as a principal grievance the injury the subject might
sustain by the exposure of his private papers to the scrutiny and
misconception of strangers.
The writs of assistance in the colonies, against which Otis, Adams
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and Gridley spoke so ably and so boldly, were obnoxious on the
same grounds as the general warrants of Lord Halifax, and were
susceptible of the same abuses.'
These were fresh in the public mind when the convention which
framed the Federal Constitution was in session, and it was one of
the complaints commonly made against that body that it did not
declare the fundamental right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures. The fourth article of the amendments to the Consti-
tution supplied the defect. No one ever doubted, so far as we are
aware, that the purpose of this amendment was to embody in the
fundamental law of the land the principles laid down by Lord
CAMDEN in the Wilkes Case, and upon which the opponents of the
writs of assistance in this country had planted themselves.
The question now made is, whether telegrams in possession of
the telegraph authorities are the private papers of those who have
sent and received them. We concede that for their own protection
telegraph companies may retain them, and that they have a quali-
fied property in them for that purpose. It is also provided by
statute in some states that messages sent by telegraph shall be
retained for a certain time, in order that, if necessary, they may be
used as evidence; and such a statute may raise an implication that
they are subject to be used in evidence generally though its
terms would be fully answered by restricting the use to the par-
ties directly concerned, namely, the sender, the receiver and the'
telegraph company. But except for the benefit and protection of
the parties concerned, it would seem that the ground on which
Lord CAMDEN denounced the seizure of private papers would be
strictly applicable here, namely, that their exposure to the idle or
malicious curiosity of others "would be subversive of all the com-
forts of society."
The proper view to take of this subject seems to be to consider
it in the light of the rules which govern private correspondence by
mail. The secrecy of- private correspondence by mail has been
protected from the earliest days, and every invasion of it has been
punishable. In Great Britain an exception is theoretically made
of the case of suspected treasonable correspondence, in which a
secretary of state is allowed to issue his warrant for opening and
I The best account of these writs is found in the Appendix to Quincy's Masaa-
chusetts Reports, where some current misconceptions are corrected. -
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inspecting particular letters ;' but even this is not permitted in
this country, and the officer who opens letters to obtain evidences
of criminal conduct is himself guilty of a crime. In a fiw cases the
postmaster is permitted to open packages to ascertain whether the
privilege of the mails is being abused; as where he suspects papers
are being sent as a medium of correspondence, or obscene publica-
tions are being transmitted, and the like ; but these cases are few
and exceptional, and every person who sends such packages through
the mails understands what rights the government reserves when
accepting them. In respect to correspondence proper the secrecy
Qf the mails may be said to admit of no exception.
Nor does government protect correspondence on its own account,
because of any interest it can have in encouraging intercourse by
mail. It is true that government demands a compensation for con-
veying letters, as an express company or any other common carrier
might do, but it does not transport the mails as a business, with a
view to a remunerative profit expected therefrom. The government
seeks no profits, and it arranges its tariff of charges on a considera-
tion of what is most for the public good, rather than from regard
to cost. Its principles of action are therefore governmental, not
private; and its carrying the mail at all is to be justified on the
ground that private enterprises could not be expected to accommo-
date so completely and so uniformly all sections of the country, but
would govern their action by their own interest rather than by
considerations of a broad and liberal public policy. It may be
safely affirmed, therefore, that government does not protect the
secrecy of correspondence in order that it may obtain more busi-
ness, but because the secrecy tends to the promotion of public and
family confidence, and encourages a most valuable feeling of security
in free intercommunication between all classes of community. The
reasons for protection, in other words, are precisely the same while
private letters are passing through the mails as they are after the
letters have been deposited in private desks or safes. No doubt
correspondence by express would be protected in like manner if it
were deemed politic or wise to encourage that method of communi-
cation as a rival to transportation by the government.
I Perhaps it may safely be assumed that this right, like the right to veto legis-
lation, has become obsolete ; the last instance in which it was exercised having
been in 1844.
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If the new means of correspondence by telegraph were such as
countervailed some principle of public policy, or some govern-
mental interest, and if it were purely a matter of choice with the
citizen whether he would avail himself of it or not, those who used
the telegraph might properly enough be left to take all the risks
of their confidence being abused, or to provide against it as best
they might. But it is certain that it countervails no public policy.
This is fully settled by the statutes which encourage the construc-
tion of telegraph lines, permitting private lands to be appropriated
for the purpose against the will of the owners, and by those which
encourage the use of the telegraph by providing rules for impar-
tiality and secrecy. Neither is the use of the telegraph a matter
of mere choice. Business transactions cannot be successfully car-
ried on without resort to its facilities, and the exigencies of family
communication are daily demanding the most speedy transmission
of messages that shall be found possible. Indeed the government
itself is affected by the same compulsion, and not a day or an hour
passes that some government official is not making use of the wires
to accomplish purposes for which the post office service would be
altogether too tardy. Foreign intercourse is conducted by the as-
sistance of the telegraph; the army is moved; vessels of the navy
despatched from port to port; officers guided in their duties; impor-
tant consultations had between distant points; offenders arrested
and payments made; all by means of the facilities it affords. In a
great variety of cases, therefore, and those too of the highest im-
portance, the use of this means of correspondence is not only
urgent, but absolutely imperative.
And yet it is said that this immense and important correspond-
ence, which concerns every possible relation of public and private
life, is subject to the subpoma duces tecum of any court that may
see fit to call for it, and must be produced on the demand of any
party who believes or suspects it.contains evidence important to his
interest, or who chooses to cast a drag net over it in order to ascer-
tain whether he may*not use it to his advantage.
The reasons assigned for subjecting it to the process of the courts
are that otherwise "the telegraph may be used, with the most ab-
solute security, for purposes destructive to the well being of so-
ciety; a state of things rendering its absolute usefulness at least
questionable. The correspondence of thd traitor, the murderer,
the robber and the swindler, by means of which their crimes and
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frauds could be the more readily be accomplished, and their detec-
tion and punishment avoided, would become things so sacred that
they could never be accessible to the public justice, however deep
might be the public interest involved in their production:" (Judge
KIUNG in .fenisler v. Friedman, 2 Pars. Sel. Cas. 274.) This is
perfectly true, and should not be ignored when this important sub-
ject is under discussion. But it is also true that "the correspond-
ence of the traitor, the murderer, the robber and the swindler, by
means of which their crimes and frauds [can] be the more readily
accomplished, and their detection and punishment avoided," are
now by the laws of the United States made so "sacred" that they
are not "accessible to the public justice, however deep might be
the public interest involved in their production." But the same
law that protects the correspondence of offenders against the laws
protects that between the husband and wife, the parent and child,
the lover and his mistress, the principal and his agent, the partner
and his associate, the official and his constituent; in short, the cor-
respondence in every relation of life. To protect the correspond-
ence of the criminal is not the purpose of the post office laws: it
is protected incidentally in protecting the general correspondence
of the country, and because no possible method could be devised of
discovering that which is meretricious without disclosing the infin-
itely larger quantity which is innocent. It is therefore protected
because the interests that would suffer from the violation of secrecy
are vastly greater than any that can be subserved. Indeed there
is scarcely room for question that public justice would suffer instead
of being aided by removing the protection of the law from private
correspondence; for while an offender might now and then be dis-
covered by seizing and opening his letters, the wrongs that might
be accomplished by obtaining possession of the secrets of others
who were using the niails innocently would so far outweigh the in-
considerable benefits, that the American people would never tolerate
official surveillance of their private and business correspondence.
It will hardly do to dismiss such a subject with the off-hand re-
mark that "the thief or the murderer is not to be heard to demand
secrecy for his criminal communications," unless at the same time
it can be shown that -the official mind can by intuition select the
vicious correspondence and pass by without inspection that which is
harmless and innocent, and the privacy of which is absolutely
essential to the peace and comfort of society.
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We can understand how a court may hold that telegraphic corre-
spondence is not beyond the reach of its process when there is no
statute which forbids disclosure, because it may be said with some
plausibility, though as it seems to us not justly, that the despatches
have not been sent under any express or implied assurance of pro-
tection ;1 but where the observance of secrecy is required by law,
the right to have telegraphic communication protected, as that by
mail is, seems unquestionable. Upon this subject the following
propositions are affirmed:-
1. The statutes which forbid those intrusted with them from
disclosing telegraphic communications are not restricted in their
force to the imposition of penalties for disobedience, but they an-
nounce and establish a principle of public policy which is violated
as distinctly when a telegram is brought into court for public
exposure as when it is privately shown to persons having no right
to it. The disclosure contravening and tending to defeat the policy
of the law cannot be legalized by any judicial command or license.
2. The case is within the principle laid down in Wilkes v. Wood
and Entinck v. Carrington. If one's private correspondence is to
be given to the public, the method is not important; it is equally
injurious whether done by sending an officer to force locks and
take it, or by compelling the person having the custody to pro-
duce it. A subpcena duces tecum to the servant of Wilkes, com-
manding him to produce the desired letters and papers, would no
doubt have been denounced by Lord CAMDEN in terms as vigorous
and pointed as those which condemned the illegal warrants.
3. It is not only subject to all the mischiefs which attend the
' See State v. Litclifield, 58 Ale. 267; s. c. 10 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 376, and
Judge REDFIELD'S Note. This learned jurist, evidently speaking of the case
.where disclosure is not prohibited, says: "The rule in.regard to the inviolability
of correspondence by telegraph is one mainly resting upon an honorary under-
standing between the company or their servants and their employers. It is not in
any proper sense a perfect or legal duty or obligation. It certainly could not be
made the basis of an action in court that the operators on a telegraph line had
made the messages public, unless some pecuniary loss ensued to the parties sending
or receiving the same." We doubt this, if secrecy were required by law. When the
observance of secrecy for the benefit of individuals is positively enjoined by law,
we see no reason for holding that the party concerned may be protected where a
slight pecuniary interest is affected by the disclosure, but shall not be if it only
touches him in what is still more important, his domestic or social relations.
When any distinct legal right is violated an action will lie for it; the extent of
pecuniary injury is only a question of damages.
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prying into correspondence by mail, but also to others of most
serious character. The evils in other cases are, the exposure of
family and other private confidences, the divulging of business and
official secrets which parties, of right, are entitled to preserve, the
furnishing of occasion for scandal and misconceptions, to the gen-
eral disturbance of the community, and others of similar nature.
But these are greatly aggravated in the case of telegrams, by the
manner in which the correspondence is necessarily conducted.
Telegraphic communication is expensive. A long message sent
by mail costs three cents, when if sent by telegraph it would cost,
perhaps, a thousand times that sum. Economy of words is, there-
fore, highly important, and is studied by all classes. The message
is made as brief as possible, and every word is omitted which can
be spared and still express to the receiver the intended meaning.
But this renders the message much more. liable to misconception
when read by those who know nothing of the previous correspond-
ence or business, and who must therefore interpret it without the
extrinsic assistance which the parties themselves would have. Mr.
Dickens has shown, in the "Bardell case," how cunning or malice
may extort from an abstracted communication almost any desired
meaning; and what was caricature with the novelist might be
reality in innumerable cases, if the proper and innocent correspond-
ence of business men or of families were to be placed in the hands
of those interested in perverting its meaning.1
Telegraphic correspondence is necessarily exposed to two per-
sons, the operators at the ends of the line. But it very 6ften
happens that reasons which are entirely proper will exist for con-
cealing from the operators the real import of a message; and in
such cases pains will be taken to express it in such terms that only
the sender and the receiver shall understand it. It is a known and
common method of correspondence that, by previous arrangement,
certain words are fixed upon to represent ideas foreign to their
proper meaning, or that arbitrary signs or expressions are made
use of. Not only is this true in the case of business correspondence,
but in the case of family correspondence; and even the government
I The fact that messages by telegraph may be unintelligible to all but the sender
and receiver was recognised in Rittenhouse v. Independent Line, 4-c., I Daly 474;
s. c. on appeal, 44 W. Y. 463. The operator must receive and send messages as
they are delivered to him, whether he understands them or not, and is liable for
errors if he does not. Ibid.
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makes use of a cipher where secrecy is important. When a cipher
is employed, the discovery of the key will enable one to read it
with accuracy; but a mistake ini any one particular might be
fatally misleading. But where the message is written out, with
only the substitution of one or more arbitrary terms, to conceal
the nature of the negotiation, or the subject of the communication,
it may not only be misleading on its face, but there may be no
possibility of arriving at the proper meaning without the explana-
tion of the parties themselves. It will be remembered that the
immense correspondence by which the national loans were effected
was conducted by the use of arbitrary symbols. What was done
on a large scale then is done by many business men, on a smaller
scale, in their correspondence with agents and factors. To open
this to the public is not only to subject the parties to all the an-
noyances, and expose them to all the risks, which must follow from
seizing correspondence in the mail, but also to the dangers which
must come from misconceiving an intent which has purposely been
concealed.
Telegraphic communication, if not inviolable, offers a perpetual
temptation to malice. A legislative committee may employ the
power of calling for it to blacken the reputation .of an opponent;
a business rival may be annoyed and perhaps seriously com-
promised by means of it; a family feud may be avenged or quick-
ened by bringing out confidential messages, and so on. All that
is requisite is a suit, and a magistrate not over-nice respecting the
admissibility of evidence, and the messages are always at hand,
ready to be called for. To get letters, it might be necessary to
resort to stratagem, and perhaps to violence. It is idle to say
that these are merely fanciful and wholly improbable cases; they
may occur at any time when the interest or the malice of others is
sufficiently powerful to instigate proceedings which in law are
baseless. Even the judge may.not be able to protect the party
whose communications mischief or malice would drag before the
public; for, as Mr. Justice lAULE observed, in a case where an
attempt was made to require an attorney to produce the title-deed
of a third person, if the judge were to decide that it was not a
proper instrument of evidence, "His decision might be made the
subject of an argument in open court, by bill of exceptions; and
thus the contents of the deed might be Communicated to all the
world." Folant v. Soyer, 10 0. B. 231, 235. In that manner the
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mischief would be accomplished, whether the writing was or was
not received in evidence.
The common law required an attorney to preserve an honorable
secrecy respecting the communications made to him by his client;
and this secrecy not even the process of the courts was suffered to
unlock. The rule was based on an unquestioned principle of pub-
lic policy, which invited clients to the freest possible communica-
tion respecting their affairs with the counsel called in to advise
respecting them. The tendency of modern decisions has been to
extend rather than to narrow the rule, from a conviction that though
sometimes the cause of justice might be advanced by compelling
disclosures, the evils that would result would greatly overbalance
the possible advantages: Foster v. Hall, 12 Pick. 89; (Jromach
v. Heatheote, 2 Brod. & B. 4; Begnell v. Sprye, 10 Beav. 51;
Greenough v. Gaskell, 1 Myl. & K. 98; Moore v. Bray, 10 Penn.
St. 519.
Vice-Chancellor KIGHT BRucE has said with great force in
one case that "truth, like all other good things, may be loved
-unwisely, may be pursued too keenly, may cost too much. And
surely the meanness and the mischief of prying into a man's con-
fidential consultations with his legal adviser, the general evil of
infusing reserve and dissimulation, uneasiness, and suspicion, and
fear, into those communications which must take place, and which,
unless in a condition of perfect security, must take place uselessly
or worse, are too great a price to pay for truth itself:" Pearse v.
.Peare, 11 Jur. 52, 54. The learned Vice-Chancellor's condem-
nation of enforced disclosures would probably have been made still
more emphatic and pointed if the case were such that what was
disclosed would tend rather to lead away from the truth than to
lead toward it. That the common law did not in like manner pro-
tect communications to medical and spiritual advisers has long been
felt as a reproach, and legislation in recent years has removed this
reproach in some states. Will it be said if by statute a clergyman
is forbidden to disclose the secrets imparted to him for the purpose
of obtaining spiritual advice and direction, that nevertheless a jus-
tice of the peace or judge may -compel the disclosure ? If so, are
we not entitled to be told whence comes this power to dispense with
the laws? It is not a power commonly supposed to exist in any
department of the government, and if asserted, clear warrant 6ught
to be shown for it. Especially ought that to be the case, when,
INVIOLABILITY OF TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATIONS. 77
apparently, it would antagonize and defeat the very purpose for
which the law was enacted.
It was conceded at the outset that there are cases in which tele-
grams are proper instruments of evidence, as private letters would
be under like circumstances. Contracts are made by this species
of correspondence, notices are given, orders are sent and informa-
tion conveyed, and wherever either of the parties may have an in-
terest in showing the facts, no one questions the right to use the
telegrams for the purpose. But this is simply using their own
documents, and contravenes no policy of the law. No doubt the
telegraph may be used for the purposes of defamation; and in that
case the dispatch may be produced as evidence by the receiver:
Williamson v. Freer, Law Rep. 9 C. P. 393.
No one disputes the law of these cases; it is plain enough. What
is disputed is, the right to compel the telegraph authorities to pro-
duce private messages which, by the course of the business are
necessarily left in their possession, but under a confidence imposed
by the law. If the operator can be compelled to produce them,
then on the same reasons a postmaster may be brought into court
and compelled to produce the undelivered postal cards for examina-
tion, though the law of Congress forbids his exhibiting them. And
why may not a justice of the peace, or a legislative committee, com-
pel a man's servant, left in temporary possession of his letters and
diaries, to produce them for the examination of his enemies, aid to
furnish the reporters of daily papers with sensational literature ?
And if a search in a telegraph office and a seizure of a man's pri-
vate correspondence is not an unreasonable search and seizure, on
what reasons could the search for and exposure of his private jour-
nals be held to be an invasion of his constitutional right?
It may be said with truth that postal cards in the post office are
in the custody of the law, and that may be assigned as the reason
why their production cannot be compelled. This is true also of
telegraphic communication in England. But the mere fact that
they are in the custody of the law is no reason whatever for de-
clining to require their production. The records of every court
are in the custody of the lawi and so is eiery enrolled statute.
They cannot be taken from this custody, but the proper custodian
may be required to produce them as evidence whenever the cause
of justice may demand it. To the government it is a matter of in-
difference whether these communications shall or shall not be dis-
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closed, except as, by discouraging the correspondence it might tend
to affect injuriously the general interests of society. The reasons
against disclosure are therefore reasons that concern individuals
exclusively, or only concern the government as the disclosure may
tend to defeat the purposes for which the government assumes the
transportation and control of correspondence.
But, it is said, if telegrams may not be called for, then in many
cases the truth may not be reached; and justice requires the fullest
disclosure of the truth. As a general principle that is correct; but
sages of the law, as wise as any now living, long ago determined
that in many cases a full revelation of the truth would produce
more evils than it could possibly prevent. Every case of privileged
communication rests upon that ground; it is important that the
truth should be known, but it is more important that a confidence
essential in the particular relation should not be violated. A wife
may know that her husband is a thief; it is important that his guilt
should be proved; but to make the wife a witness against the hus-
band is to endanger the relation on which, more than any other,
our civilization depends. A spy is sometimes a greater public pest
than a thief, and often a man might be more injured by having
what he has innocently written or received, in the unreserved con-
fidence of affection, given to the public, than he would be by being
knocked down and robbed. Truth is important, but the state can-
not afford to purchase the truth at the expense of principles on
which alone a peaceful and contented society may repose.
In brief, then, the doctrine that telegraph authorities may be
required to produce private messages, on the application of third
persons, is objected to, on the following grounds:-
1. That it defeats the policy of the law, which invites free com-
munication, and to the extent that it may discourage correspond-
ence, it operates as a restraint upon industry and enterprise, and,
what is of equal importance, upon intimate social and family cor-
respondence.
2. It violates the confidence which the law undertakes to render
secure, and makes the promise of the law a deception.
3. It seeks to reach a species of evidence which, from the very
course of the business, parties are interested to render blind and
misleading, and which, therefore, must often present us with error
in the guise of truth, under circumstances which preclude a disco-
very of the deception.
